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Abstract
Objectives
To test the heterogeneity of the effect of a change in pharmaceutical cost-sharing by thera-
peutic groups in a Spanish region.
Methods
Data: random sample (provided by the Canary Islands Health Service) of 40,471 people
covered by the Spanish National Health System (SNHS) in the Canary Islands. The data-
base includes individualised monthly-dispensed medications (prescribed by the SNHS)
from one year before (August 2011) to one year after (June 2013) the Royal Decree Law 16/
2012 (RDL 16/2012). Sample: two intervention groups (low-income pensioners and middle-
income working population) and one control group (low-income working population). Empiri-
cal model: quasi-experimental difference-in-differences design to study the change in con-
sumption (measured in number of monthly Defined Daily Dose (DDDs) per individual)
among 13 therapeutic groups. The policy break indicator (three-level categorical variable)
tested the existence of stockpiling between the reform’s announcement and its implementa-
tion. We ran 16 linear regression models (general, by therapeutic groups and by comorbidi-
ties) that considered whether the exclusion of some drugs from public provision impacted on
consumption more than the co-payment increase.
Results
General: Reduction (-13.04) in consumption after the reform’s implementation, which was
fully compensated by a previous increase (16.60 i.e., stockpiling) among low-income
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pensioners. The middle-income working population maintained its trend of increasing con-
sumption. Therapeutic groups: Reductions in consumption after the reform’s implementa-
tion among low-income pensioners in 7 of the 13 groups, which were fully compensated for
by a previous increase (i.e., stockpiling) in 4 groups and partially compensated for in the
remaining 3. The analysis without the excluded medicines provided fewer negative coeffi-
cients. Comorbidities: Reduction in consumption that was only slightly compensated for by a
previous increase (i.e., stockpiling).
Conclusions
The negative impact of cost-sharing produced, among low-income pensioners, a risk of loss
of adherence to treatments, which could deteriorate the health status of individuals, espe-
cially among pensioners within the most inelastic therapeutic groups (associated with
chronic diseases) and patients with comorbidities (also, associated with chronic diseases).
Notwithstanding the above, this risk was more related to the exclusion of some drugs from
provision than to the cost-sharing increase.
1. Introduction
The nature of the disease to be treated (e.g., chronic versus acute or severe versus mild) is a key
factor to understand the behaviour of individuals’ pharmaceutical consumption [1]. Research
has shown that patients with chronic diseases are less sensitive to drug price changes than
non-chronic ones [2]. While it is true that most studies establish a general inelastic price-elas-
ticity of drugs of around -0.2 [2–4], there is also evidence that the most inelastic drugs are
those indicated for the treatment of chronic diseases with price-elasticity of approximately
-0.08 [4].
Consequently, pharmaceutical co-payments have different impacts depending on the dis-
ease being treated, as well as many other determining factors (e.g., age, sex, income, social sta-
tus, and educational level). A recent study using 15 different therapeutic drug groups,
following ATC code rules (drugs grouped according to their Anatomical, Therapeutic and
Chemical characteristics), analysed the sensitivity of each of these groups to a cost-sharing
change and found that there were different price-elasticities depending on the therapeutic
group [5]. In this regard, it is important to consider the heterogeneity of the effect of a pharma-
ceutical co-payment by therapeutic groups because the establishment of high co-payments
among people with chronic diseases could become a ‘tax on illness’ [6]. Accordingly, despite
the fact that, on average, co-payments do not lead to deterioration in the health status of the
population, there are two important exceptions: low-income people and chronic patients [7].
Therefore, the consequences of the introduction of drug co-payments could be worse among
people with chronic or severe diseases than among other patients.
The 2012 Spanish reform, implemented by the Royal Decree Law 16/2012 (RDL 16/2012),
increased the cost-sharing of both the working population and pensioners (with monthly con-
tribution ceilings for pensioners). This reform established co-payments depending on income
(i.e., according to three income intervals) but regardless of the nature of the disease to be
treated (e.g., according therapeutic groups of drugs), with the exception of ATC drugs for the
treatment of chronic diseases that had a reduced contribution, which had been introduced in
1978 [8]. However, this reform also increased the contribution ceiling per pack of ATC drugs
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with reduced contribution (cf. Table 1). For this reason, the main aim of this paper is to verify
the heterogeneity of the effect of this cost-sharing change in pharmaceutical consumption by
therapeutic groups to demonstrate the relevance and necessity of taking it into account. We
evaluate the therapeutic groups that were most affected by the co-payment change. In this
regard, we hypothesise, in accordance with existing evidence [9,10], that the pharmaceutical
consumption will decrease as a result of the increase in the co-payment share. We also estimate
the effect for those individuals who have been dispensed medicines from two or more thera-
peutic groups compared with the effect of those people who have been dispensed medicines
from only one therapeutic group. This analysis could serve as a useful approach for the con-
sumption of people with comorbidities. Thus, we hypothesise the decrease will be especially
marked among people with several diseases because these patients are dependent on high lev-
els of pharmaceutical private spending [11]. Moreover, we also estimate the monthly effect and
hypothesise that the main effect of the reform on drug prescriptions will be mitigated during
the following months as some studies have shown [12,13, 14].
In order to avoid a biased interpretation of the reform’s impact on pharmaceutical con-
sumption, it is quite important to take into account three key factors that may have impacted,
together with the co-payment increase, on individuals’ consumption. First, the possibility of
stockpiling after the reform’s announcement must be considered. To detect this, we investigate
whether there was anticipated acquisition of drugs (i.e., stockpiling) for some therapeutic
groups after the reform’s announcement. We hypothesise, according to the existing evidence,
that the expected negative impact of the cost-sharing change on drug consumption was pre-
ceded by previous anticipated purchasing of drugs [15], especially, among those therapeutic
groups related to chronic diseases [16]. Second, the RDL 16/2012 was a bundle policy that
Table 1. Coinsurance change.
Before After
Groups and contribution codes created by SNHS Income
intervals ()
Coinsurance (%) Monthly
ceiling ()
Coinsurance
(%)
Monthly
ceiling ()
Pensioners
Non-contributory pensioners, toxic syndrome or disability (contribution
code: TSI 001)
- 0 - 0 -
Low-income contributory pensioners (contribution code: TSI 002) < 18,000 0 - 10 8
Middle-income contributory pensioners (contribution code: TSI 002) 18,000–
99,999
0 - 10 18
High-income contributory pensioners (contribution code: TSI 005) � 100,000 0 - 60 60
Working population
Toxic syndrome; disability; recipients of income from social integration;
unemployed who have used up their unemployment benefit as long as
their situations persist; work accidents and occupational diseases
(contribution code: TSI 001)
- 40 40/0 -
Low-income working population (contribution code: TSI 003) < 18,000 40 - 40 -
Middle-income working population (contribution code: TSI 004) 18,000–
99,999
40 - 50 -
High-income working population (contribution code: TSI 005) � 100,000 40 - 60 -
ATC drugs with reduced contribution regardless of the contribution
code of individuals
- 10 Ceiling per
pack ()
10 NOTE Ceiling
per pack ()
2.16 4.24
List of 426 medicines excluded from public provision - 40, for working population
and 0, for pensioners
- 100 -
NOTE: Despite the ceiling per pack in 2012 being 4.24, it is updated automatically each January according to the changes in the consumer price index.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0213403.t001
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apart from the co-payment increase included other relevant measures among which we high-
light the exclusion of 426 drugs from public provision on September 1st, 2012. In this regard,
we hypothesise that this will have a sizable effect on the pharmaceutical consumption after the
reform (as [13] suggested) and, consequently, the negative effect on consumption will be miti-
gated if we remove the list of medicines excluded from public provision. Third, there was
some variation in the date for the implementation of monthly contribution ceilings. The effec-
tive implementation of monthly contribution ceilings was not done simultaneously in all the
Autonomous Regions (e.g., on November 1st, 2012 in the Canary Islands). Thus, we hypothe-
sise, without previous evidence of it, that in November 2012, a transitory recovery in pension-
ers’ consumption took place as a consequence of the effective implementation of their
contribution ceilings.
This study has been carried out in one of the seventeen Spanish Autonomous Regions, the
Canary Islands, which are composed of seven islands (Tenerife, La Palma, La Gomera, El
Hierro, Gran Canaria, Fuerteventura and Lanzarote). Each Autonomous Region has authority
to organise and manage the provision and resources for health care services for its citizens.
Nonetheless, the main policy on medical products, which includes the regulation of the co-
payment system, is state-based rather than regional.
This research provides interesting contributions because we compare the reform’s impact
among 13 therapeutic groups (with 13 price-elasticities of demand) composed of medicines
used for the treatment of chronic (e.g., cardiovascular agents and anti-hyperlipidemics) and
non-chronic (e.g., genitourinary and pulmonary drugs) illnesses, evidence of which is very
limited in Spain. In this regard, we would like to place special emphasis on the relevance of our
paper in terms of testing the heterogeneity of the effect of a change in pharmaceutical cost-
sharing by therapeutic groups. Consequently, the existence of heterogeneity in the impact of
medicines used for the treatment of chronic and non-chronic diseases would indicate that
establishing co-payment according to therapeutic groups would be required. Additionally, we
investigate the impact of the reform among patients with comorbidities, evidence about which
is also quite limited. Finally, we provide a robust and innovative analysis, as we estimate the
impact on pharmaceutical consumption controlling for three key factors (i.e., possibility of
stockpiling, exclusion of 426 drugs from public provision and varied implementation dates of
monthly contribution ceilings’).
1.1. International evidence of co-payment effects on consumption,
utilisation or adherence by therapeutic groups
Two scientific publications [9,10] have collected some international evidence about the effect
of drug co-payment and both found that pharmaceutical co-payments reduced the use of
drugs. One study [17] with data from the Pharm-net database (between 1999 and 2005) ana-
lysed the influence of co-payment on two commonly used medicine groups (cholesterol-low-
ering medication and acid-blocking agents) in Belgium. The study (using change-point linear
mixed models) revealed that an increase in cost sharing reduced the use of medications in the
short term.
1.1.1. Stockpiling evidence. Regarding empirical evidence of stockpiling, there was a
study [16] for Spain in which the authors estimated the association between the implementa-
tion of 1 co-payment per prescription and drug consumption of the publicly insured popula-
tion of Catalonia. Using administrative data (between 2012 and 2014) on monthly
pharmaceutical consumption (measured in Defined Daily Dose (DDDs)), they observed that
patients anticipated drug purchasing during the two months prior to the reform. They also
found that pensioners stockpiled more than the working population and by therapeutic
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groups, they uncovered that this anticipation effect is more common among those therapeutic
groups related to chronic diseases.
Another study [18], using data from the entire Danish population in 2000 (with data from
the Danish Medicines Agency), focused on two specific drugs: insulin, with foreseeable future
need, and penicillin for acute infections, with unforeseeable future need. The authors demon-
strated (through discontinuous regression models) that the amount of insulin increased at the
moment of the cost-sharing’s announcement, giving rise to a stockpiling phenomenon. There
is an update on this previous study [19], which centred on two different antibiotics: penicillin
and dicloxacillin, whose future need is impossible to predict and, therefore, it is not possible to
stockpile before a cost-sharing increase. The authors concluded that the increase in prescrip-
tion co-payment was quite price inelastic.
1.1.2. Effect of co-payments in essential (related to serious illnesses) and less essential
medicines. Another overall conclusion of the literature on co-payment is that the demand
for essential medicines, which are related to serious illnesses, is more inelastic than the demand
for less essential medicines, which are related to less serious illnesses. In this regard, we high-
light the following four studies.
The first study [20] applied data from both 1994–95 and 1996–97 National Population
Health Surveys (NPHS) in Canada for seniors (65–84 years old) and people that required social
assistance. The authors analysed the effect of prescription drug insurance coverage status on
the use of specific medications (grouped by chronic and acute diseases; and by essential and
less essential medications). The study found (by the use of instrumental variables method) that
drug charges did not affect the use of drugs for either chronic medications or essential drugs
but had some impact on the use of drugs for acute conditions and less essential medications.
The second study [21] used four provincial health databases in Canada (1996) to estimate
the impact of introducing drug co-payment for the elderly and welfare recipients on essential
and less essential medications. The authors concluded (through random-effects, pooled-time
series regression) that the co-payment change reduced the use of less essential drugs more
than the use of essential ones.
Regarding the third study [22], the authors applied a register-based data set from a 20% ran-
dom sample of the population (between 2000 and 2003) in Denmark. They investigated the
price sensitivity of demand for specific prescription drugs comparing the use of essential medi-
cine with other less essential drugs. The study reflected (by the use of a regression kink design)
that essential drugs had much lower associated average price sensitivity than other less essen-
tial medicines.
Finally, the fourth analysis [23] used interrupted time-series data collected by the Drug Uti-
lization Sub-committee (DUSC) of the Pharmaceutical Benefits Advisory Committee (PBAC)
in Australia (1990). The authors detected (through segmented linear regression models) that
the cost-sharing change reduced the use of essential and non-essential medicines. Neverthe-
less, there also was a post-intervention trend for increased prescriptions of essential drugs after
the initial decline, which was not detected for non-essential medicines.
Overall, the literature tends to conclude that people are more sensitive to cost-sharing
changes with less essential than with essential medicines, and also there is evidence of higher
sensitivity among acute patients to cost-sharing changes than chronic patients (with demon-
strated needs). The following studies are examples of this.
1.1.3. Effect of co-payments in patients with acute and chronic conditions. The authors
of the following study [24] applied data from claims and eligibility records of Medicare Part D
members that did not receive the low-income subsidy in the United States (between 2009 and
2011). They analysed the effect of a cost-sharing reduction (from $35 to $0-$4 per month of
treatment) on brand-name statins (as generic statins maintained cost-sharing, their consumers
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were used as control group) and concluded (by the use of a logistic regression model) that the
reduction in co-payment statins improved the adherence to brand name statins.
Another paper [25] used data from the Federfarma to analyse the effect of co-payments on
the use of statins in Italy (between 2001 and 2007). The control group were consumers in
regions without co-payments for statins, while the intervention group were consumers in
regions with co-payment for statins. The paper inferred (through segmented regression analy-
sis) that co-payment slightly reduced the consumption trend but not the level of consumption.
The following study [26] applied longitudinal administrative micro-data to analyse the
effect of a change in cost-sharing in Canada (between 1995 and 1997) for senior chronic
patients. The results showed (using an instrumental variable method) low expenditure elastic-
ity (between -0.12 and -0.16). Also, we found two studies [27,28] using administrative data-
bases of the Canadian Ministry of Health to assess the impact of a drug cost-sharing increase
on the use of drugs among seniors with rheumatoid arthritis in Canada (between 1996 and
2002). The authors of both papers concluded (through instrumental variables and difference-
in-differences design, respectively) that despite the demand for prescription drugs decreasing,
the demand for physician visits increased.
One final paper [29] used the database from the Swedish Prescribed Drug Register to study
how refill adherence varies according to patients’ co-payment levels for antiepileptic drugs in
Sweden (2007). The study reflected (by the use of multilevel mixed-effects linear regression
models) that the adherence rate was greater for antiepileptic drugs among those patients with
free full-coverage than for those patients that had to pay 100% of the drug price.
1.2. The Royal Decree Law 16/2012 in Spain
The Spanish Government implemented the RDL 16/2012, which is the most important Health
System reform in the last forty years, in order to control public health spending [30,31] and
with the aim of achieving a long-term sustainable Spanish National Health System (SNHS)
[30]. This reform, in the form of bundle policy, included some measures among which we
highlight:
First, the working population went from 40% cost-sharing regardless of income to a co-pay-
ment percentage depending on three different income intervals. Similarly, the majority of pen-
sioners went from free full-coverage to 10% co-payment with monthly ceilings (cf. Table 1). It
is of interest that not all the Autonomous Regions applied the monthly contribution ceilings
simultaneously (e.g., on November 1st, 2012 with the introduction of a computer system in the
Canary Islands). To recover the money paid between July 1st, 2012 and November 1st, 2012,
pensioners had three alternatives to calculate the extra money that they had paid over their
monthly contribution ceilings: convert it into an unused balance; to receive payments into
their current account every six months until the extra money paid was compensated; or to
make an application at the request of stakeholders [32].
Second, the proposed implementation of an electronic prescription system that would help
reduce stockpiling and more easily control all the relevant information (e.g., medical history,
treatments, medicines prescribed, adherence to treatments and prices) [33]. Despite this
reform (RDL 16/2012) further regulating the establishment of an electronic prescription sys-
tem, there had previously been other laws that had the same purpose: Law 16/2003; Law 29/
2006; and RDL 1718/2010, which detailed general aspects for the development of electronic
prescriptions and the right way to successfully implement it. The implementation of the elec-
tronic prescription system in all Canary Island municipal districts was a progressive process
that was fully implemented in Spain in about 2015 [33]. In fact, in those areas where electronic
prescriptions were fully implemented, it was still possible for the doctor to choose between the
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traditional and the electronic prescription system [34]. This absence of prescription control
facilitated prescription duplication between 2011 and 2013 (the period of our study) and made
it possible to stockpile drugs. For this reason, it makes sense to analyse the existence of the
stockpiling in this study.
Third, there was the exclusion from public provision of 426 drugs on September 1st, 2012.
The reasons for the exclusions were: the establishment of selected prices; the coexistence with
an over-the-counter medication with which it shared the active ingredient and dosage; the
consideration of the medication as advertising in the European environment; the favourable
safety and efficacy profile of the active ingredient; the excluded drug was indicated in the treat-
ment of minor symptoms; or the drug fulfilled any of the criteria of non-inclusion in public
financing specified in section 2, Article 89, RDL 16/2012 [30].
1.3. Evidence of RDL 16/2012 effects on consumption, utilization or
adherence by therapeutic groups
Several studies that analysed the impact of RDL on pharmaceutical dispensed prescriptions
agree that the reform generated an immediate reduction in pharmaceutical prescriptions
[12,35,36,37,38,39]. Nevertheless, some studies found this reduction temporary [12,13,14].
Despite the majority of these contributions only showing a general effect, we have found four
papers that analysed the impact of the reform on specific drugs.
The first study [12] used the IMS Health database (between 2012 and 2015). The analysis
revealed (through segmented linear regression models) that the reform generated an immedi-
ate non-permanent reduction in prescription consumption. After the first 12–18 months, con-
sumption levels recovered. By therapeutic groups (anti-diabetics; antithrombotic; and asthma
and COPD drugs), the authors detected that those medications prescribed for chronic diseases
(e.g., diabetes) were less sensitive to changes in prices than those prescribed for less serious dis-
eases. The estimated variation rate of the DDDs was negative but decreased for three therapeu-
tic groups in the following 6, 12, 24 and 38 months following the reform.
The evidence of stockpiling is quite limited in Spain. In fact, [12,13] have been the only
studies found that analysed stockpiling effects caused by the RDL 16/2012. The authors
showed that a stockpiling effect took place between the reform’s announcement (April 20th,
2012) and its implementation (July 1st, 2012). In particular, the elderly group is more likely to
employ this strategic behaviour because the elderly (and the rest of pensioners) benefited from
free full coverage until the arrival of RDL 16/2012, which generated a problem related to the
‘Moral Hazard’ [40–42]. Moreover, the elderly have a natural tendency to suffer more illnesses
and, consequently, consume more drugs than younger people [12]. Nevertheless, there has
been no evidence reported as to which therapeutic groups practise stockpiling the most.
Regarding the second research study [13], the authors used aggregate monthly data from
the Official Association of Pharmacists of the region of Murcia (between 2008 and 2013). The
analysis showed (through segmented regression analysis by therapeutic groups) that co-pay-
ment changes affected the consumption of drugs in the short term. However, this negative
effect, slowed down, and was even compensated for gradually. Some groups of medicines
showed reduced consumption more than others (e.g., the use of benzodiazepines even
increased).
With respect to the third study [14], the authors applied data from several electronic infor-
mation systems of the Valencia Health System to analyse the impact of pharmaceutical co-pay-
ment on adherence to essential medication in patients with acute coronary syndrome in the
region of Valencia (between 2009 and 2013). This study showed (through the Difference-in-
Differences method) that the cost-sharing change generated a temporary reduction in
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adherence among the middle-income working population and low-income pensioners for
essential medications with high prices.
We also found a fourth paper [31] demonstrating that the implementation of new co-pay-
ments led to a 10% reduction in the volume of units sold in the following three months after
the implementation of the reform. This paper made reference to a report from the pharmaceu-
tical industry [43], which reflected that the decrease experienced in pharmaceutical prescrip-
tions was not homogeneous across drugs. Those medications indicated for the treatment of
chronic illnesses fell more than those for acute diseases.
Finally, despite the following study [16] not exactly analysing the reform of July 2012, we
consider it worth including in this section because the reform analysed in this paper was
implemented in a Spanish region (i.e., publicly insured population of Catalonia) in June 2012.
Specifically, the authors tested the association between the implementation of 1 co-payment
per prescription and drug consumption, and they observed that a uniform capped low co-pay-
ment may considerably reduce drug consumption (measure in DDDs) among individuals who
previously benefited from free prescriptions.
2. Methodology
2.1. Ethics statements
The Canary Islands Health Service provided us with the data. In this regard, our study com-
plied with the terms of service for the Canary Islands Health Service database and we used
these data with appropriate permissions from this third party. In addition, we also clarify that
all data were anonymized before we accessed them for this study.
2.2. Data
We used a representative random sample (provided by the Canary Islands Health Service) of
40,471 people covered by the SNHS in the Canary Islands, stratified into seven health areas
and labour status (working population or pensioners). For each individual, there is informa-
tion about dispensed medications prescribed by the SNHS from one year before (2011) to one
year after (2013) the implementation of the RDL 16/2012 on July 1st, 2012. The resulting data-
set included information on individuals (i.e., age, sex, island of residence, health centre, simu-
lated income, working population or pensioner status, contribution code and contribution
ceiling); information about any change in individual circumstances during the period under
study (e.g., moving from working population to pensioner or changes in income); and pre-
scription information (i.e., prescription date, daily number of prescriptions per individual,
daily pharmaceutical expenditure per individual, National Code (NC), anatomical, therapeutic
and chemical code (ATC) and Number of DDDs). From these disaggregated data, we com-
puted, monthly number of dispensed prescriptions and monthly pharmaceutical expenditure
for each patient. In total, there are 24 observations per individual, one for each month of the
studied period. For those months without consumption by individuals we recorded a zero
value.
The original database did not include information about the specific income of each indi-
vidual of the sample but just which of three income intervals established by the SNHS the indi-
vidual belongs to (cf. Table 1). For this reason, we built a simulated income variable. To create
it, we ran 10,000 Monte Carlo simulations for the specific income of each individual as follows.
First, we specified set seed 12345 to set the seed of the random-number generator so that the
results would be reproducible. Second, to obtain 10,000 estimates, we created a place in mem-
ory (by the use of postfile buffer command) where we stored the results. Third, we ordered that
the process should be repeated 10,000 times (by the use of forvalues i = 1/10,000 command).
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Fourth, we dropped the previous data (by the use of quietly drop all command) and generated
the five simulated income intervals (I<6010; 6,010� I� 12,020; 12, 020� I� 18, 030; 18,
030� I� 21,035; I> 21,035) from a random uniform distribution. These intervals are the
same as those used by the Spanish Tax Agency to apply Personal Income Tax. We ordered
here that in the case of those individuals with income below 18,000 (as in the original SNHS
interval), the income must fall within one of the first three new intervals. Likewise, in the case
of those individuals with income between 18,000 and 100,000, the income must fall within the
two last new intervals. Also, for generating this simulated variable, we controlled the percent-
age of people that belonged to each one of the above five income intervals. We obtained this
information from a Spanish Tax Agency database for 2013. This database disaggregated this
information by municipal district. As we had the municipal district variable in our database,
we used it as a way of merging between each database. After generating the simulated income
variable, we estimated the mean and stored the estimations (by the use of post buffer com-
mand). Finally, we wrote the results (by the use of postclose buffer command) in our database.
As our database did not contain the number of DDDs variable, we built it for each one of
the 8,121 drugs that compose the database by creating a complementary one, using ‘National’
and ‘ATC’ codes. To obtain this variable, we used the DDDs established by the World Health
Organization (WHO) according to the active ingredient of each drug. This information is
available on the WHO Collaborating Centre for Drug Statistics Methodology website [44]. In
the cases that this website did not provide the necessary information, we used a report from
the Spanish Ministry of Health, Equality and Social Policy [45]. Then, we obtained both, the
number of doses contained within each drug and the quantity of active ingredient that each
dose contains through the Spanish Agency of Medicines and Medical Devices website [46].
Finally, we calculated the number of DDDs:
No:DDDs ¼
No:doses contained in each drug pack� qty:active ingredient contained in each dose
DDDs established by the WHO according to the active ingredient of each drug
In this regard, as WHO Collaborating Centre for Drug Statistics Methodology website speci-
fies, most products that belong to the dermatological therapeutic group are for topical use.
Accordingly, no DDDs are assigned because the amount given per day can vary greatly according
to the intensity and distribution of the disease. For this reason, for topical dermatological prepara-
tions, instead of using the DDDs, it was expressed in grams of preparation regardless of strength.
Then, with this information (grams of preparation), the procedure to calculate the number of
DDDs for each topical dermatological drug was the same as for the rest of the drugs.
No:derma:DDDs
¼
No:doses contained in each drug pack� qty:active ingredient contained in each dose
grams of preparations regardless of strength
We used quasi-experimental difference-in-differences design to analyse the change in drug
consumption (measured in monthly number of DDDs per individual) caused by the reform
implemented on July 1st, 2012. The database included two variables that code different medicines:
the National Code of medicine (NC, with 7,799 different codes included in the database), which
identifies drugs with the highest disaggregated level; and the Anatomical, Therapeutic, Chemical
classification system (ATC, with 357 different codes included in the database), which aggregates
drugs in families of medicines with similar anatomical, therapeutic and chemical characteristics.
With the aim of having a more aggregated level of therapeutic groups for the analysis, we used the
ATC variable to create 15 different therapeutic groups. Each one of these groups has an associated
price-elasticity according to the study by Puig Junoy J. et al. [5], in which the authors calculated
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different price-elasticity through a difference-in-differences approach. Price-elasticity varied from
-0.26 to -0.03 depending on therapeutic group. We could not calculate our own price-elasticity
because of limitations in the database (i.e., the variability of co-payments was quite low (from 0 to
10% or from 40% to 50%) and the contributions of the users in the database were very small).
There is a study [4] that estimated a price-elasticity (for the elderly population) around -0.20 for
non-chronic and around -0.08 for chronic diseases. These values were very useful, as a guide, to
interpret our results. We had to remove from the sample Biological and immunological agents
because the number of observations that belonged to these therapeutic groups was too small.
Therefore, the analysis only focused on the 13 remaining therapeutic groups.
2.3. Sample
We defined one control and two intervention groups. Our control group was low-income
working population (NC = 25,588), subject to 40% co-payment throughout the period and,
therefore, not affected by the reform (except for some ATC levels: ATCs with reduced contri-
bution for some chronic diseases, which increased their contribution ceiling and medicines
withdrawn from public provision in September 2012 (cf. Table 1)). This group, whose contri-
bution code is TSI 003 (cf. Table 1), is composed of people with annual incomes lower than
18,000 and aged between 16 and 65 and their dependents (mainly minor children or minors in
foster care). In addition, this group includes children and pregnant women (during the preg-
nancy, birth and postpartum periods) from countries without collaboration agreements with
Spain or immigrants. Finally, working population from a different Autonomous Region in
which the prescription does not indicate the contribution code assigned, are also included in
this group (only while the electronic prescription system was not fully implemented in all the
Autonomous Regions). It should be clarified that, people with toxic syndrome, the disabled
working population, recipients of income from social integration, unemployed who had used
up their unemployment benefit, and those off work because of work accidents or occupational
diseases are not included in the working population group (TSI 003) because they have a spe-
cific contribution code (TSI 001) assigned (cf. Table 1).
Our first intervention group is low-income pensioners (NI1 = 7,898), who moved from free full
coverage to 10% co-payment with a monthly ceiling for all medications of 8. This group, whose
contribution code is TSI 002 (cf. Table 1), refers to people with annual incomes lower than 18,000
over the age of 65 (who have reached retirement age) and those under the age of 65 (who have
taken early retirement). Dependents of low-income pensioners (mainly children or minors in fos-
ter care, e.g., grandchildren) also belong to this group. It is of interest that, non-contributory peo-
ple with toxic syndrome and disabled pensioners are not included in the pensioner group (TSI
002) because they have a specific contribution code (TSI 001) assigned (cf. Table 1).
Our second intervention group is middle-income working population (NI2 = 6,985), who
moved from 40% to 50% co-payment. This group, whose contribution code is TSI 004 (cf.
Table 1), includes people with annual incomes between 18,000 and 99,999 and aged between
16 and 65 and their dependents (mainly minor children or minors in foster care). This group
also includes foreigners with European Health Insurance Cards and people from countries
with collaboration agreements with Spain that does not prove their status as pensioners.
2.4. Empirical model
We defined the linear regression model:
Yigt ¼ b0 þ
X
t0 6¼0
bt0Dt0 þ dIgt þ gIgtDt�1 þ mCigt þ εigt
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where i indexes individual, g indexes group, and t indexes time. Yigt is monthly pharmaceutical
consumption, measured as number of monthly DDDs per individual of the sample. Dt is a
monthly dummy variable used to control for time trends affecting all groups (1, for July, 2011;
2, for August, 2011,. . ., and 24, for June, 2013). Igt is a measure of the intervention, it is a three-
level categorical variable for one control and two intervention groups: control group is low-
income working population (0) and intervention groups are low-income pensioners (1) and
middle-income working population (2). Dt�1 is the policy break indicator, three-level categori-
cal variable: before reform’s implementation and before its announcement (0), before the
reform’s implementation but after its announcement (1), after the reform’s implementation
(2). Cigt is a vector of individual-specific covariates, including age, sex, municipal district and
simulated incomes. εigt is the random error. We computed the analysis by the use of Stata-15.
We estimated a total of 16 regression models adjusted for clustering by individual. We first
considered all the therapeutic groups (general analysis: Y1igt = number of monthly DDDs per
individual for model 1). We then estimated thirteen linear regression models, one for each
therapeutic group (Y2igt = number of monthly cardiovascular DDDs per individual for model 2;
Y3igt = number of monthly anti-hyperlipidemics DDDs per individual, for model 3,. . ., Y
14
igt =
number of monthly pulmonary drugs DDDs per individual, for model 14). We finally esti-
mated two linear regression models: the fifteen, for estimating the behaviour of individuals
with comorbidities (Y15igt = number of monthly DDDs per individual who each month was dis-
pensed medicines from two or more therapeutic groups, for model 15) and the sixteen for esti-
mating the behaviour of individuals with one disease (Y16igt = number of monthly DDDs per
individual who each month was dispensed medicines from one therapeutic group, for model
16). We should highlight that we actually do not have information on patients’ comorbidities
(as our database does not provide information about the specific diseases of individuals). We
have also assumed that the approach of comorbidities among individuals with different dis-
eases from the same therapeutic group (e.g., high blood pressure and bad cholesterol) cannot
be considered in the analysis. Therefore, we have approached patients having comorbidities as
those who have been dispensed medicines from two or more therapeutic groups.
For each regression model, we estimated both, the period between the RDL’s announce-
ment and implementation–from May 1st, 2012 to July 1st, 2012 –and the period after the RDL’s
entry into force–from July 1st, 2012 to June 1st, 2013–. Despite the reform’s announcement tak-
ing place on April 20th, 2012, we decided to analyse the period between the RDL’s announce-
ment and implementation as of May 1st, 2012 in order to start the analysis with a whole
month. As the regression models were composed of one control and two intervention groups,
we obtained two different DID coefficients for each model: one for the difference between the
control and the first intervention group, and another for the difference between the control
and the second intervention group. Apart from this, there was a monthly analysis that included
the estimates for each month of the studied period. Each coefficient showed the change in the
number of monthly DDDs per individual.
3. Results
3.1. Descriptive statistics
Low-income working population is the most numerous group in the sample followed by mid-
dle-income working population and low-income pensioners. The percentage of women is
greater among low-income pensioners (58.4%) and low-income working population (52.6%).
As for demographic information, there are fewer pensioners in Fuerteventura, Lanzarote and
Tenerife than in the rest of the islands where the percentage remains at around 20%. The
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majority of low-income pensioners were dispensed medicines for the treatment of cardiovas-
cular drugs (49.9%). Regarding low-income working population, the most common drugs dis-
pensed to this group were those indicated for the treatment of analgesic diseases (8.4%). With
respect to middle-income working population, the majority of them were dispensed medicines
for the treatment of cardiovascular diseases (9.8%). Also, the individuals who belonged to this
group were those who recorded more changes in their contribution code after the reform,
moving to low-income working population. It is of interest to highlight that the group that
seemed to include more patients with comorbidities was the low-income pensioners (cf.
Table 2).
The average monthly pharmaceutical prescriptions per individual was much higher in all
the therapeutic groups for pensioners than for the working population during the three differ-
ent analysed periods (9 months before the announcement of the reform; 2 months during the
reform’s announcement and its implementation; and 11 months after the reform’s implemen-
tation) (cf. Table 3).
The consumption variation rates showed that the only group that reduced its pharmaceuti-
cal consumption after the reform’s implementation was low-income pensioners (with a reduc-
tion of between 3.23% and 18.18%, except for eye, ear, nose and throat medication which
showed a 45% decrease). The other individuals of the sample (low-income working population
and middle-income working population) maintained their increasing consumption trend that
existed before the reform (cf. Table 3 and Fig 1). We compared the consumption variation rate
and price variation rate and we obtained that, on the whole, the effect of the reform on con-
sumption was small (consumption variation rate/price variation rate was <1), except in the
cases of central nervous system (1.23), dermatological (2), analgesics/anti-inflammatories
(1.05), eye, ear, nose and throat preparations (1.33), anti-infective (2) and genitourinary agents
(2), where there was a positive impact on pharmaceutical consumption among middle-income
working population.
In the case of low-income pensioners, average monthly pharmaceutical prescriptions were
higher in the period prior to the reform than after it for Cardiovascular agents, Endocrine/
metabolic agents, Dermatological, Analgesics/anti-inflammatories, Eye, ear, nose and throat
preparations, Upper respiratory agents and Pulmonary drugs. By contrast, there were more
prescriptions after the reform for Anti-hyperlipidemics, Central nervous system agents, Diabe-
tes drugs, Gastrointestinal drugs, Anti-infective and Genitourinary agents (cf. Fig 1).
The results also suggest the existence of stockpiling by pensioners in all therapeutic groups
(except gastrointestinal drugs, anti-infective and upper respiratory agents), because they
increased their average monthly pharmaceutical prescriptions after the announcement and
reduced it after the reform. Nevertheless, this anticipation effect was not clearly detected
among working population (cf. Table 3 and Fig 1).
3.2. Model estimates
The general analysis after the reform’s implementation reflected different results in consump-
tion (measured as number of monthly a DDDs per individual) for each intervention group.
While, low-income pensioners showed a decrease (-13.94), middle-income working popula-
tion showed an increase (1.22) in the number of monthly DDDs per individual (cf. Table 4).
By therapeutic groups, we also detected mixed results after the reform’s implementation.
For low-income pensioners, we found statistically significant decreases in consumption for
cardiovascular agents (-2.27), eye, ear, nose and throat preparations (-1,88), endocrine/meta-
bolic agents (-1.31), analgesics/anti-inflammatories (-0,86), dermatological (-0,69), pulmonary
drugs (-0.53) and genitourinary agents (-0,20). The results for central nervous system agents
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Table 2. Demographic key outcomes variables.
Low-income Pensioners (Intervention 1) Low-income working
population (Control)
Middle-income working
population (Intervention
2)
% of individuals
19.5 (7,898) 63.2 (25,588) 17.3 (6,985)
Age average of individuals within each group
64 32 34
% of individuals within each group by sex
Women Men Women Men Women Men
58.4 41.5 52.6 47.4 49.0 51.0
Income average of individuals within each group
8889 8880 52094
% of individuals per island
Fuerteventura 10.8 71.9 17.3
Gran Canaria 22.9 59.6 17.49
La Gomera 21.9 61.3 16.8
El Hierro 23.0 60.0 17.1
Lanzarote 12.9 69.9 17.2
La Palma 23.2 60.3 16.5
Tenerife 18.4 64.4 17.2
% of individuals within each group that have obtained medicines at any time during the studied period
Cardiovascular agents 49.9 7.3 9.8
Antihyperlipidemics 31.0 4.1 5.5
Endocrine/metabolic agents 44.2 6.2 7.0
Central nervous system agents 39.0 7.7 7.8
Biological� 0.4 0.2 0.3
Diabetes drugs 17.7 2.3 3.0
Dermatological 6.7 2.0 1.84
Gastrointestinal drugs 4.57 1.0 0.9
Analgesics/anti-inflammatories 33.6 8.4 7.4
Eye, ear, nose and throat preparations 9.0 0.7 1.0
Anti-infective 7.3 5.6 5.2
Immunological agents� 0.0 0.0 0.1
Upper respiratory agents 1.7 1.0 1.2
Genitourinary agents 9.3 1.8 1.9
Pulmonary drugs 11.8 5.2 5.1
% of individuals who have been dispensed medicines from two or more therapeutic groups
54.05 (4,562) 35.61 (3,006) 10.34 (873)
% of individuals who have been dispensed medicines from one therapeutic group
10.42 (3,336) 70.50 (22,582) 19.08 (6,112)
Number of individuals that changed their contribution code after the reform
To: Low-income pensioners (TSI 002) Low-income working
population (TSI 003)
Middle-income working
population (TSI 004)
From:
Low-income pensioners (TSI 002) - (350) (9)
Low-income working population (TSI 003) (383) - (938)
Middle-income working population (TSI 004) (136) (1,070) -
The number of individuals is shown in parentheses.
�Biological and immunological agents have been removed from the sample because the number of individuals in each of these groups is not enough.
The therapeutic groups are sorted by price-elasticity (at the top the most inelastic, while at the bottom the most elastic).
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0213403.t002
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Table 3. Average monthly pharmaceutical prescriptions per patient before, during and after the reform announcement and variation rates.
9 months before
(August 1st,
2011-May 1st, 2012)
2 months during
(May 1st,
2012-July 1st, 2012) NOTE 1
11 months after
(July 1st, 2012-June 1st, 2013)
V. rate:
consumption NOTE 2 (%)
V. rate:
price NOTE 2 (%)
V. rate
consumption
(%)/V. rate price
(%)
All groups
Low-income
pensioners
5.51 (435,789) 6.25 (98,675) 5.34 (506,539) -9.18 9900 -0,000927273
Low-income
working
population
0.77 (196,868) 0.84 (42,998) 0.94 (287,904) 16.77 0 -
Middle-
income
working
population
0.83 (57,637) 0.91 (12,711) 1.04 (86,903) 19.54 25 0.78
Cardiovascular agents
Low-income
Pensioners
1.11 (88,054) 1.23 (19,513) 1.07 (101,751) -8.55 9900 -0,000863636
Low-income
working
population
0.11 (26,881) 0.12 (6.193) 0.12 (37.645) 4.35 0 -
Middle-
income
working
population
0.14 (9,741) 0.16 (2,243) 0.17 (14,083) 13.33 25 0.53
Anti-hyperlipidemics
Low-income
Pensioners
0.37 (29,293) 0.42 (6,666) 0.38 (36,030) -3.80 9900 -0,000383838
Low-income
working
population
0.04 (10,825) 0.05 (2,550) 0.05 (15,946) 11.11 0 -
Middle-
income
working
population
0.06 (4,124) 0.07 (988) 0.07 (5,915) 7.69 25 0.31
Endocrine/metabolic agents
Low-income
Pensioners
0.65 (51,483) 0.74 (11,752) 0.61 (58,083) -12.23 9900 -0,001235354
Low-income
working
population
0.07 (17,369) 0.08 (4,013) 0.08 (24,668) 6.67 0 -
Middle-
income
working
population
0.08 (5,495) 0.09 (1,250) 0.09 (7,790) 5.88 25 0.24
Central nervous system agents
Low-income
Pensioners
0.91 (71,779) 1.03 (16,324) 0.97 (92,312) 0.00 9900 0
Low-income
working
population
0.12 (32,679) 0.14 (7,361) 0.16 (50,320) 23.08 0 -
Middle-
income
working
population
0.12 (8,563) 0.14 (1,965) 0.17 (13,994) 30.77 25 1.23
Diabetes drugs
Low-income
Pensioners
0.29 (22,646) 0.33 (5,219) 0.30 (28,751) -3.23 9900 -0,000326263
(Continued)
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Table 3. (Continued)
9 months before
(August 1st,
2011-May 1st, 2012)
2 months during
(May 1st,
2012-July 1st, 2012) NOTE 1
11 months after
(July 1st, 2012-June 1st, 2013)
V. rate:
consumption NOTE 2 (%)
V. rate:
price NOTE 2 (%)
V. rate
consumption
(%)/V. rate price
(%)
Low-income
working
population
0.03 (8,441) 0.04 (1,991) 0.04 (12,771) 14.29 0 -
Middle-
income
working
population
0.04 (2,927) 0.05 (684) 0.05 (4,488) 11.11 25 0.44
Dermatological
Low-income
Pensioners
0.10 (8,089) 0.12 (1,908) 0.09 (8,453) -18.18 9900 -0,001836364
Low-income
working
population
0.02 (5,565) 0.02 (1,222) 0.03 (8,286) 50.00 0 -
Middle-
income
working
population
0.02 (1,337) 0.02 (314) 0.03 (2,204) 50.00 25 2
Gastrointestinal drugs
Low-income
Pensioners
0.06 (4,967) 0.07 (1,145) 0.07 (6,211) 7.69 9900 0,000776768
Low-income
working
population
0.01 (2,686) 0.01 (594) 0.01 (3,890) 0.00 0 -
Middle-
income
working
population
0.01 (656) 0.01 (140) 0.01 (1,062) 0.00 25 0
Analgesics/anti-inflammatories
Low-income
Pensioners
0.70 (55,277) 0.80 (12,724) 0.67 (63,202) -10.67 9900 -0,001077778
Low-income
working
population
0.11 (27,320) 0.11 (5,665) 0.13 (41,431) 18.18 0 -
Middle-
income
working
population
0.09 (6,373) 0.10 (1,331) 0.12 (9,893) 26.32 25 1.05
Eye, ear, nose and throat preparations
Low-income
Pensioners
0.18 (14,545) 0.22 (3,474) 0.11 (9,995) -45.00 9900 -0,004545455
Low-income
working
population
0.01 (2,300) 0.01 (583) 0.01(2,697) 0.00 0 -
Middle-
income
working
population
0.01 (977) 0.02 (227) 0.01 (1,028) -33.33 25 1.33
Anti-infective
Low-income
Pensioners
0.08 (6,681) 0.09 (1,360) 0.14(12,946) 64.71 9900 0,006536364
(Continued)
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(1.01) and anti-infective drugs (0.24) reflected an increase in the number of monthly DDDs
per individual. For middle-income working population, the majority of effects were not statis-
tically significant and those statistically significant presented an increase in the number of
monthly DDDs per individual after the reform’s implementation for cardiovascular agents
(0.33), dermatological (0.12), anti-infective (0.06) (cf. Table 5).
Table 3. (Continued)
9 months before
(August 1st,
2011-May 1st, 2012)
2 months during
(May 1st,
2012-July 1st, 2012) NOTE 1
11 months after
(July 1st, 2012-June 1st, 2013)
V. rate:
consumption NOTE 2 (%)
V. rate:
price NOTE 2 (%)
V. rate
consumption
(%)/V. rate price
(%)
Low-income
working
population
0.07 (16,693) 0.06 (3,226) 0.09(27,703) 38.46 0 -
Middle-
income
working
population
0.06 (4,041) 0.06 (796) 0.09 (7,459) 50.00 25 2
Upper respiratory agents
Low-income
Pensioners
0.02 (1,510) 0.02 (320) 0.02 (1,741) 0.00 9900 0
Low-income
working
population
0.01 (2,531) 0.01 (448) 0.01 (3,347) 0.00 0 -
Middle-
income
working
population
0.01 (823) 0.01 (176) 0.01 (1,224) 0.00 25 0
Genitourinary agents
Low-income
Pensioners
0.11 (9,002) 0.13 (2,005) 0.12 (11,621) 0.00 9900 0
Low-income
working
population
0.02 (3,996) 0.02 (1,090) 0.03 (8,361) 50.00 0 -
Middle-
income
working
population
0.02 (1,270) 0.02 (293) 0.03 (2,434) 50.00 25 2
Pulmonary drugs
Low-income
Pensioners
0.23 (18,111) 0.25 (4,002) 0.20 (18,788) -16.67 9900 -0,001683838
Low-income
working
population
0.08 (18,788) 0.07 (3,662) 0.08 (23,260) 6.67 0 -
Middle-
income
working
population
0.08 (5,335) 0.07 (994) 0.08 (6,421) 6.67 25 0.27
NOTE 1: It should be remembered that the reform’s announcement took place on April. 20th 2012, but in order to consider a whole month, the analysis was started from
May 1st, 2012. The therapeutic groups are sorted by price-elasticity (at the top the most inelastic, while at the bottom the most elastic).
NOTE 2: The variation rate was calculated comparing the average monthly pharmaceutical prescription per individual 11 months before the implementation of the
reform with the average monthly pharmaceutical prescription per individual 11 months after the implementation of the reform. As low-income pensioners moved from
0% to 10% of co-payment it was not possible to obtain its exact price variation rate. For that, we have made an approach assuming that low-income pensioners moved
from 0.1% to 10% (instead of from 0% to 10%).
(number in brackets)
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0213403.t003
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Fig 1. Monthly pharmaceutical consumption by therapeutic groups. The monthly period covers from July 2011 to
June 2013; April 2012: April 20th, 2012 was the date on which RDL 16/2012 was announced; July 2012: July 1st, 2012
was the date on which RDL 16/2012 entered into force (date of cost sharing change). The therapeutic groups are sorted
by price-elasticity (on the left the most inelastic, while on the right the most elastic). . . . . . . line corresponds to low-
income pensioner population (first intervention group); ___ corresponds line to middle-income working population
(second intervention group); -—line corresponds to low-income working population (control group).
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0213403.g001
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Table 4. Overall effect of the cost-sharing change on the pharmaceutical consumption.
Low-income pensioners and low-
income working population analysis
Middle-income working population and low-
income working population analysis
All groups
During-before the
announcement
16.60��� (0.86) 0.58 (0.36)
After-during the
announcement
-13.04��� (0.79) 1.22��� (0.33)
The table contains Difference-in-Differences estimates from linear regression models with robust standard errors.
Each cell contains results of the model from different therapeutic groups. All regressions include age and age2, and
time dummies. Within each cell, we first report the estimated coefficients; we then report in parentheses robust
standard errors. The therapeutic groups are sorted by price-elasticity (at the top the most inelastic, while at the
bottom the most elastic).
Significance levels
���p < 0.01
��p < 0.05.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0213403.t004
Table 5. Overall effect of the cost-sharing change on the pharmaceutical consumption by therapeutic groups.
Low-income pensioners and low-
income working population analysis
Middle-income working population and low-
income working population analysis
Cardiovascular agents
During-before the
announcement
3.00��� (0.26) 0.20 (0.11)
After-during the
announcement
-2.27��� (0.26) 0.33���(0.11)
Anti-hyperlipidemics
During-before the
announcement
1.20���(0.11) 0.10 (0.06)
After-during the
announcement
-0.05 (0.11) 0.03 (0.06)
Endocrine/metabolic agents
During-before the
announcement
2.54���(0.20) 0.01 (0.08)
After-during the
announcement
-1.31���(0.18) 0.07 (0.07)
Central nervous system agents
During-before the
announcement
2.41��� (0.20) -0.01 (0.09)
After-during the
announcement
1.01��� (0.22) 0.16 (0.12)
Diabetes drugs
During-before the
announcement
0.92��� (0.15) -0.05 (0.08)
After-during the
announcement
0.09 (0.11) 0.10 (0.05)
Dermatological
During-before the
announcement
0.40���(0.16) 0.12 (0.09)
After-during the
announcement
-0.69���(0.14) 0.12�� (0.06)
Gastrointestinal drugs
(Continued)
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In order to fully analyse the effect of the reform, we need to compare the behaviour of indi-
viduals after the reform’s announcement with their behaviour after its implementation.
Accordingly, the general analysis reflected an increase (16.60) in consumption among low-
income pensioners, which fully compensated for the subsequent reduction (-13.94) (cf.
Table 4).
Table 5. (Continued)
Low-income pensioners and low-
income working population analysis
Middle-income working population and low-
income working population analysis
During-before the
announcement
0.10���(0.04) 0.00 (0.02)
After-during the
announcement
-0.01 (0.03) 0.02 (0.01)
Analgesics/anti-inflammatories
During-before the
announcement
1.02���(0.12) 0.04 (0.06)
After-during the
announcement
-0.86���(0.11) 0.00 (0.05)
Eye, Ear, nose and throat preparations
During-before the
announcement
0.85���(0.12) -0.02 (0.03)
After-during the
announcement
-1.88��� (0.12) -0.04 (0.03)
Anti-infective
During-before the
announcement
0.02 (0.06) 0.01 (0.04)
After-during the
announcement
0.24��� (0.04) 0.06�� (0.03)
Upper respiratory agents
During-before the
announcement
0.12��� (0.04) 0.08�� (0.04)
After-during the
announcement
-0.05 (0.04) 0.05 (0.04)
Genitourinary agents
During-before the
announcement
0.17��� (0.07) -0.09�� (0.05)
After-during the
announcement
-0.20��� (0.07) -0.08 (0.05)
Pulmonary drugs
During-before the
announcement
1.24���(0.18) 0.12 (0.08)
After-during the
announcement
-0.53��� (0.13) 0.07 (0.06)
The table contains Difference-in-Differences estimates from linear regression models with robust standard errors.
Each cell contains results of the model from different therapeutic groups. All regressions include age and age2, and
time dummies. Within each cell, we first report the estimated coefficients; we then report in parentheses robust
standard errors. The therapeutic groups are sorted by price-elasticity (at the top the most inelastic, while at the
bottom the most elastic).
Significance levels
���p < 0.01
��p < 0.05.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0213403.t005
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By therapeutic groups for low-income pensioners, we observed that those therapeutic
groups that fully compensated for the reduction with a previous increase were cardiovascular
agents (with a decrease of 2.27 after the reform preceded by an increase of 3.00, the total
change was of 0.73); endocrine/metabolic agents (with a post-reform decrease of 1.31 and a
pre-reform increase of 2.54 the total change was 1.23); analgesics/anti-inflammatories (with a
post-reform decrease of 0.86 and a pre-reform increase of 1.02 the total change was of 0.16);
and pulmonary drugs (with a decrease of 0.53 after the reform preceded by an increase of 1.24
the total change was 0.71). By contrast, those therapeutic groups that only partially compen-
sated the reduction experimented after the reform’s implementation were dermatological
(with a decrease of 0.69 after the reform preceded by an increase of 0.40 the total change was
-0.29); eye, ear, nose and throat preparations (with a post-reform decrease of 1.88 and pre-
reform increase of 0.85 the total change was -1.03); and, genitourinary agents (with a post-
Fig 2. Monthly follow-up effect of the cost-sharing change on the pharmaceutical consumption. The graphics contain Difference-in-
Differences estimates from linear regression models with robust standard errors with a 95% confidence interval (CI). All regressions include age
and age2, and time dummies. We used for the analysis bar graphics with standard errors. The monthly period covers from August 2011 to June
2013; April 2012: April 20th, 2012 was the date on which the reform was announced; July 2012: July 1st, 2012 was the date on which the reform
entered into force (date of cost-sharing change); September 2012: September 1st, 2012 was the date on which 426 were excluded from public
provision. We provide two models: Model 1 refers to the regression model run with all the medicines of the database (including the drugs
excluded from public provision). Model 2 refers to the regression model run without the drugs excluded from public provision.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0213403.g002
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reform decrease of 0.20 and a pre-reform increase of 0.17 the total change was -0.03). In addi-
tion, central nervous system agents experienced increased consumption after the reform’s
announcement (2.41), but also increased after its implementation. Furthermore, anti-hyperli-
pidemics (1.20), diabetes drugs (0.92) gastrointestinal drugs (0.10), upper respiratory agents
(0.12) showed increased consumption after the reform’s announcement, but they were not fol-
lowed by statistically significant results after the reform’s implementation. For middle-income
working population, there were no statistically significant results to highlight (cf. Table 5).
The monthly follow-up for low-income pensioners in the general analysis did not reflect a
clear recovery in the number of monthly DDDs per individual. The estimations showed the
highest reduction (-35.74) in September 2012 followed by a small recovery in November 2012
(i.e., changing from -35.74 in September to -22.13 in November 2012). Notwithstanding this
recovery, we did not observe that the consumption level that would have existed in absence of
Fig 3. Monthly follow-up effect of the cost-sharing change on the pharmaceutical consumption: Cardiovascular Agents. The figures contain
Difference-in-Difference estimates from linear regression models with robust standard errors with a 95% confidence interval (CI). All regressions
include age and age2, and time dummies. We used for the analysis bar graphics with standard errors. The monthly period covers from August
2011 to June 2013; April 2012: April 20th, 2012 was the date on which the reform was announced; July 2012: July 1st, 2012 was the date on which
the reform entered into force (date of cost-sharing change); September 2012: September 1st, 2012 was the date on which 426 were excluded from
public provision. Model 1 refers to the regression model run with all the medicines of the database (including the drugs excluded from public
provision). Model 2 refers to the regression model run without the drugs excluded from public provision.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0213403.g003
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the reform was reached in the following months. For middle-income working population,
there were only statistically significant results in August 2012, January 2013 and May 2013
(with increases of 2.04, 1.67 and 1.85 in the number of monthly DDDs per individual). How-
ever, the results of the monthly analysis without the list of 426 drugs excluded from public pro-
vision showed a slight recovery in consumption (cf. Fig 2 and S1–S3 Tables).
The negative effect in the overall analysis for almost all the therapeutic groups for low-
income pensioners (cardiovascular agents’ diseases, eye, ear, nose and throat preparations,
endocrine/metabolic agents, analgesics/anti-inflammatories, dermatological, pulmonary drugs
and genitourinary agents) was maintained in the months following the reform. The only thera-
peutic group that seemed to recover its consumption level was pulmonary drugs. Unlike the
overall analysis, the monthly follow-up study provided statistically significant decreases for
anti-hyperlipidemics and diabetes drugs in some months without a clear recovery of the
Fig 4. Monthly follow-up effect of the cost-sharing change on the pharmaceutical consumption: Antihyperlipidemics. The figures contain
Difference-in-Difference estimates from linear regression models with robust standard errors with a 95% confidence interval (CI). All
regressions include age and age2, and time dummies. We used for the analysis bar graphics with standard errors. The monthly period covers
from August 2011 to June 2013; April 2012: April 20th, 2012 was the date on which the reform was announced; July 2012: July 1st, 2012 was the
date on which the reform entered into force (date of cost-sharing change); September 2012: September 1st, 2012 was the date on which 426 were
excluded from public provision. Model 1 refers to the regression model run with all the medicines of the database (including the drugs excluded
from public provision). Model 2 refers to the regression model run without the drugs excluded from public provision.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0213403.g004
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consumption level. Regarding upper respiratory agents, we detected an increase in November
2012. However, for most of the therapeutic groups, we observed the biggest reduction in Sep-
tember 2012, which was followed by a minor recovery between October and November 2012
that did not hold in the following months. We also found that most of the therapeutic groups
that included a significant percentage of drugs from the list of excluded medicines from public
provision (i.e., anti-hyperlipidemics; cardiovascular agents; dermatological; endocrine/meta-
bolic agents; eye, ear, nose and throat preparations; pulmonary drugs) were also those that
notably reduced consumption over months. Accordingly, the therapeutic groups that con-
tained excluded drugs reported a minor negative coefficient or even a recovery in consump-
tion when we ran the regression model without the excluded drugs (cf. Figs 3–15 and S1, S3
and S5 Tables). For middle-income working population, there were some months in which
Fig 5. Monthly follow-up effect of the cost-sharing change on the pharmaceutical consumption: Endocrine/Metabolic Agents. The figures
contain Difference-in-Difference estimates from linear regression models with robust standard errors with a 95% confidence interval (CI). All
regressions include age and age2, and time dummies. We used for the analysis bar graphics with standard errors. The monthly period covers
from August 2011 to June 2013; April 2012: April 20th, 2012 was the date on which the reform was announced; July 2012: July 1st, 2012 was the
date on which the reform entered into force (date of cost-sharing change); September 2012: September 1st, 2012 was the date on which 426 were
excluded from public provision. Model 1 refers to the regression model run with all the medicines of the database (including the drugs excluded
from public provision). Model 2 refers to the regression model run without the drugs excluded from public provision.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0213403.g005
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eye, ear, nose and throat preparations and analgesics/anti-inflammatories reflected a small
decrease in their number of monthly DDDs per individual. Apart from this, the results for the
remaining therapeutic groups that provided statistically significant estimates (cardiovascular
agents, diabetes drugs, dermatological and anti-infective) showed a positive effect of the cost
sharing (cf. Figs 3–15 and S2 and S3 Tables).
Additionally, regarding those individuals with comorbidities (estimated as people who have
been dispensed medicines from two or more therapeutic groups), we observed a statistically
significant decrease in consumption (-20.37) among low-income pensioners, which was pre-
ceded by a previous increase of 5.56. By contrast, we detected an increase in consumption
(2.60) after the reform, among patients who were dispensed medicines from one-therapeutic
group. For middle-income working population, we observed a statistically significant increase
Fig 6. Monthly follow-up effect of the cost-sharing change on the pharmaceutical consumption: Central Nervous System Agents. The
figures contain Difference-in-Difference estimates from linear regression models with robust standard errors with a 95% confidence interval
(CI). All regressions include age and age2, and time dummies. We used for the analysis bar graphics with standard errors. The monthly period
covers from August 2011 to June 2013; April 2012: April 20th, 2012 was the date on which the reform was announced; July 2012: July 1st, 2012
was the date on which the reform entered into force (date of cost-sharing change); September 2012: September 1st, 2012 was the date on which
426 were excluded from public provision. Model 1 refers to the regression model run with all the medicines of the database (including the drugs
excluded from public provision). Model 2 refers to the regression model run without the drugs excluded from public provision.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0213403.g006
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in consumption (0.43) after the reform among patients who were dispensed medicines from
one therapeutic group (cf. Table 6).
Although during the months after the reform we did not detect a consumption recovery
among low-income pensioners with comorbidities, the consumption slightly recovered when
we developed the analysis without the list of 426 medicines excluded from public provision.
For middle-income working population, the estimates were not statistically significant. In the
case of patients (low-income. Pensioners and middle-income working population) who were
dispensed medicines from one therapeutic group, we observe an increasing trend over the
months (cf. Fig 16 and S4 Table).
4. Discussion
There was a negative impact of the cost-sharing change on the drug consumption of low-
income pensioners, as was expected [9,10]. However, as the impact of the reform on pharma-
ceutical consumption was small in all therapeutic groups (cf. variation rates comparison in
Table 3), individuals did not seem to be very sensitive to changes in drug prices, that is to say,
the price elasticity of drugs is quite low [2,3,4,5,18,19]. This means that the reform had a ‘tax
collection’ profile more than a ‘moral hazard’ reduction profile. Moreover, middle-income
working population maintained its increasing consumption trend. This behaviour reflects
that, as the literature maintains [9,10], middle-income individuals are not affected by co-pay-
ment increases.
Our analysis also shows the heterogeneity that exists of the cost-sharing effect by therapeu-
tic groups with more marked reductions among the most inelastic therapeutic groups, which
are those that mainly contain medicines for the treatment of chronic diseases. In addition, as
the analysis of co-payment effects on consumption would be biased if existence of stockpiling
were not considered, in this paper, we have highlighted the important role of stockpiling thus
overcoming the limitations of previous studies that have analysed this reform. Despite some of
Fig 7. Monthly follow-up effect of the cost-sharing change on the pharmaceutical consumption: Diabetes. The figures contain Difference-
in-Difference estimates from linear regression models with robust standard errors with a 95% confidence interval (CI). All regressions include
age and age2, and time dummies. We used for the analysis bar graphics with standard errors. The monthly period covers from August 2011 to
June 2013; April 2012: April 20th, 2012 was the date on which the reform was announced; July 2012: July 1st, 2012 was the date on which the
reform entered into force (date of cost-sharing change). As this therapeutic group does not contain medicines from the list of 426 drugs excluded
from public provision, we only provide one model.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0213403.g007
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these studies mentioning the existence of stockpiling [12,13,16], only [16] analysed it in depth.
Unlike [12,13] studies, ours not only provides key information about the behaviour of individ-
uals after a co-payment announcement, but also this key information was disaggregated by
therapeutic groups. Specifically, we only detected this anticipation phenomenon (in the form
of an increase in the number of monthly DDDs per individual after the reform’s announce-
ment and its subsequent decrease after the reform’s implementation) among low-income pen-
sioners. Stockpiling was especially marked, among the most inelastic groups, which are those
related to chronic diseases [4,16] whose future need, as some studies have asserted [12,18,19],
is predictable. As people with chronic illnesses were encouraged to stockpile [18,19], the
increase detected after the reform’s announcement seemed to be a strategic behaviour of drug
anticipation without loss of medication adherence risk (provided that the previous increase
fully compensates the subsequent reduction).
Fig 8. Monthly follow-up effect of the cost-sharing change on the pharmaceutical consumption: Dermatological. The figures contain
Difference-in-Difference estimates from linear regression models with robust standard errors with a 95% confidence interval (CI). All
regressions include age and age2, and time dummies. We used for the analysis bar graphics with standard errors. The monthly period covers
from August 2011 to June 2013; April 2012: April 20th, 2012 was the date on which the reform was announced; July 2012: July 1st, 2012 was the
date on which the reform entered into force (date of cost-sharing change); September 2012: September 1st, 2012 was the date on which 426 were
excluded from public provision. Model 1 refers to the regression model run with all the medicines of the database (including the drugs excluded
from public provision). Model 2 refers to the regression model run without the drugs excluded from public provision.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0213403.g008
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Taking the above into account, cardiovascular agents’ diseases, eye, ear, nose and throat
preparations, endocrine/metabolic agents, analgesics/anti-inflammatories, dermatological,
pulmonary drugs and genitourinary agents reflected the negative effect of the cost-sharing
Fig 9. Monthly follow-up effect of the cost-sharing change on the pharmaceutical consumption: Gastrointestinal drugs. The figures contain
Difference-in-Difference estimates from linear regression models with robust standard errors with a 95% confidence interval (CI). All
regressions include age and age2, and time dummies. We used for the analysis bar graphics with standard errors. The monthly period covers
from August 2011 to June 2013; April 2012: April 20th, 2012 was the date on which the reform was announced; July 2012: July 1st, 2012 was the
date on which the reform entered into force (date of cost-sharing change). As this therapeutic group does not contain medicines from the list of
426 drugs excluded from public provision, we only provide one model.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0213403.g009
Fig 10. Monthly follow-up effect of the cost-sharing change on the pharmaceutical consumption: Analgesics/Anti-inflammatories. The
figures contain Difference-in-Difference estimates from linear regression models with robust standard errors with a 95% confidence interval
(CI). All regressions include age and age2, and time dummies. We used for the analysis bar graphics with standard errors. The monthly period
covers from August 2011 to June 2013; April 2012: April 20th, 2012 was the date on which the reform was announced; July 2012: July 1st, 2012
was the date on which the reform entered into force (date of cost-sharing change). As this therapeutic group does not contain medicines from
the list of 426 drugs excluded from public provision, we only provide one model.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0213403.g010
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change among low-income pensioners in the period immediately after the implementation of
RDL 16/2012. This effect was compensated by previous stockpiling, except for eye, ear, nose
and throat preparations, dermatological and genitourinary, where the negative coefficients
after the implementation were greater than the previous positive coefficients. As the reduction
observed in consumption within these therapeutic groups could not be totally attributed to
previous stockpiling, we detected a risk of loss of medication adherence. By contrast, central
nervous system and anti-infective drug groups did not appear to be affected by the cost-shar-
ing change because these groups showed an increase in the number of monthly DDDs per
individual after the reform. However, we cannot rule out that these consumption increases
may be the result of an increase in the health needs among low-income pensioners with these
health conditions, but with the information available, we were not able to test for this. For
anti-hyperlipidemics, diabetes drugs, gastrointestinal drugs and upper respiratory agents,
Fig 11. Monthly follow-up effect of the cost-sharing change on the pharmaceutical consumption: Eye, ear, nose and throat preparations.
The figures contain Difference-in-Difference estimates from linear regression models with robust standard errors with a 95% confidence interval
(CI). All regressions include age and age2, and time dummies. We used for the analysis bar graphics with standard errors. The monthly period
covers from August 2011 to June 2013; April 2012: April 20th, 2012 was the date on which the reform was announced; July 2012: July 1st, 2012
was the date on which the reform entered into force (date of cost-sharing change); September 2012: September 1st, 2012 was the date on which
426 were excluded from public provision. Model 1 refers to the regression model run with all the medicines of the database (including the drugs
excluded from public provision). Model 2 refers to the regression model run without the drugs excluded from public provision.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0213403.g011
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there were statistically significant increases after the reform’s announcement but none of them
reflected statistically significant reductions after its implementation. Consequently, we were
not able to verify with the overall analysis whether these groups were affected by the cost-shar-
ing change or were subject to stockpiling practices.
For middle-income working population, there was an increase in pharmaceutical consump-
tion among cardiovascular agents, dermatological and anti-infective drugs. These results
together with those obtained in the descriptive statistics, would mean, as the literature holds
[9,10], that co-payments affect vulnerable groups the most. Therefore, the middle-income
working population is less sensitive to co-payment increases of ten percentage points (passing
from a cost sharing percentage of 40% before the reform to ones of 50% after it). According to
the descriptive statistics (cf. Fig 1), middle-income working population maintained (during
the months after the reform) the increasing trend existing before the reform in almost all the
therapeutic groups analysed.
The monthly study allowed us to verify better whether the reduction produced after July 1st,
2012 among low-income pensioners (the monthly follow-up analysis for middle-income work-
ing population did not provide any relevant information to highlight), was either a conse-
quence of the previous stockpiling effect or a real loss in medication adherence. In both cases,
for chronic and for acute therapeutic groups, there was not even a glimmer of a recovery in the
pharmaceutical consumption existing before the reform. The fact that September 2012 showed
(for the majority of therapeutic groups) the highest reduction in pharmaceutical consumption
was not coincidental, because the Spanish Government approved the resolution [47] specifying
the list of medicines that the RDL 16/2012 excluded from public provision. This resolution
came into force on September 1st, 2012.
Most of the therapeutic groups that contained a significant percentage of the excluded
drugs (i.e., anti-hyperlipidemics; cardiovascular agents; dermatological; endocrine/metabolic
agents; eye, ear, nose and throat preparations; pulmonary drugs) showed notably reduced
Fig 12. Monthly follow-up effect of the cost-sharing change on the pharmaceutical consumption: Anti-infective. The figures contain
Difference-in-Difference estimates from linear regression models with robust standard errors with a 95% confidence interval (CI). All
regressions include age and age2, and time dummies. We used for the analysis bar graphics with standard errors. The monthly period covers
from August 2011 to June 2013; April 2012: April 20th, 2012 was the date on which the reform was announced; July 2012: July 1st, 2012 was the
date on which the reform entered into force (date of cost-sharing change). As this therapeutic group does not contain medicines from the list of
426 drugs excluded from public provision, we only provide one model.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0213403.g012
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consumption in the monthly follow-up analysis. In fact, those therapeutic groups that con-
tained some of the excluded drugs slightly recovered their consumption levels when the regres-
sion model was run without these drugs. Therefore, and in line with another study [13], the
apparent lack of recovery in drug consumption in the medium-term might be the result of the
excluded drugs more than the result of the cost-sharing increase. In agreement with other
papers [12,13,14,17], the negative impact of the cost-sharing change (without considering in
the analysis the list of excluded medicines) seems to be temporary. Despite the findings from
the comparison of the analysis with and without the excluded medicines being of interest, we
did not detect a total recovery in the consumption when we ran the regression model without
the excluded medicines (except for endocrine/metabolic agents and pulmonary drugs (cf. S4
Table)). Consequently, there is a risk of a small loss of medication adherence, as a result of an
increase in co-payment percentage, especially, among the most inelastic therapeutic groups
Fig 13. Monthly follow-up effect of the cost-sharing change on the pharmaceutical consumption: Upper Respiratory Agents. The figures
contain Difference-in-Difference estimates from linear regression models with robust standard errors with a 95% confidence interval (CI). All
regressions include age and age2, and time dummies. We used for the analysis bar graphics with standard errors. The monthly period covers
from August 2011 to June 2013; April 2012: April 20th, 2012 was the date on which the reform was announced; July 2012: July 1st, 2012 was the
date on which the reform entered into force (date of cost-sharing change); September 2012: September 1st, 2012 was the date on which 426 were
excluded from public provision. Model 1 refers to the regression model run with all the medicines of the database (including the drugs excluded
from public provision). Model 2 refers to the regression model run without the drugs excluded from public provision.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0213403.g013
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that are related to chronic diseases (cardiovascular, anti-hyperlipidemic and dermatological
drugs) [16].
In addition, it was no coincidence that there was a slight recovery observed in consumption
between October and November 2012, as from July 1st until November 1st, 2012, pensioners
had to pay provisionally the full 10% of the drug price, with no monthly contribution ceiling.
The computer system whereby pensioners could benefit from the monthly ceilings was not
available until such date in the Canary Islands [33]. Notwithstanding the above, this highlights
that the consumption recovery observed in November was smaller than would have been
expected.
These results demonstrate the need to set up co-payments according to the nature of the
disease to be treated because, as the existing evidence confirms, the establishment of drug co-
payments could deteriorate the health status of low-income people and chronic patients [7]. In
this regard, we have to highlight that the current Spanish co-payment system takes into
account the income factor but does not sufficiently consider the nature of the disease being
treated. Indeed, with the 2012 reform, the list of ATC drugs with reduced contribution, which
mainly include medicines for the treatment of chronic diseases, increased the contribution
ceiling per pack (cf. Table 1).
Additionally, our analysis of comorbidities (approached as those people who have been dis-
pensed medicines from two or more therapeutic groups), reflected that low-income pensioners
strongly decrease their pharmaceutical consumption if we compare them with those who have
been dispensed medicines from one therapeutic group. Despite observing a prior increase in
their pharmaceutical consumption, probably, with the aim of anticipating drug co-payments
changes before the implementation of the reform, the subsequent decrease was much bigger.
This circumstance generates a severe risk of loss of medication adherence, probably because
patients with comorbidities have a greater pharmaceutical private spending than the rest of
patients [11]. Consequently, these low-income pensioners predictably exceeded the monthly
Fig 14. Monthly follow-up effect of the cost-sharing change on the pharmaceutical consumption: Genitourinary Agents. The figures
contain Difference-in-Difference estimates from linear regression models with robust standard errors with a 95% confidence interval (CI). All
regressions include age and age2, and time dummies. We used for the analysis bar graphics with standard errors. The monthly period covers
from August 2011 to June 2013; April 2012: April 20th, 2012 was the date on which the reform was announced; July 2012: July 1st, 2012 was the
date on which the reform entered into force (date of cost-sharing change). As this therapeutic group does not contain medicines from the list of
426 drugs excluded from public provision, we only provide one model.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0213403.g014
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contribution ceiling of 8 earlier than those with one disease to treat and this would discourage
their adherence. The monthly analysis also confirmed the risk of loss of medication adherence
among people with comorbidities. In this regard, patients with comorbidities are mainly
patients with several chronic diseases [48] and the establishment of co-payments could deteri-
orate their health status [7]. Therefore, the increase of the contribution ceiling for ATC drugs
with reduced contribution could affect patient with comorbidities in terms of health.
4.1. Strengths and limitations of the study
One of the most relevant strengths of the study was the high quality and uniqueness of the
dataset. Also, this dataset provided highly individualised information that allowed us to
develop a robust study of an individual’s behaviour before and after a co-payment reform,
Fig 15. Monthly follow-up effect of the cost-sharing change on the pharmaceutical consumption: Pulmonary Drugs. The figures contain
Difference-in-Difference estimates from linear regression models with robust standard errors with a 95% confidence interval (CI). All
regressions include age and age2, and time dummies. We used for the analysis bar graphics with standard errors. The monthly period covers
from August 2011 to June 2013; April 2012: April 20th, 2012 was the date on which the reform was announced; July 2012: July 1st, 2012 was the
date on which the reform entered into force (date of cost-sharing change); September 2012: September 1st, 2012 was the date on which 426 were
excluded from public provision. Model 1 refers to the regression model run with all the medicines of the database (including the drugs excluded
from public provision). Model 2 refers to the regression model run without the drugs excluded from public provision.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0213403.g015
The effect of a change in co-payment on prescription drug demand in a National Health System
PLOS ONE | https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0213403 March 27, 2019 32 / 39
Fig 16. Monthly follow-up effect of the cost-sharing change on the pharmaceutical consumption by
comorbidities NOTE. The graphics contain Difference-in-Differences estimates from linear regression models with
robust standard errors with a 95% confidence interval (CI). All regressions include age and age2, and time
dummies. We used for the analysis bar graphics with standard errors. The monthly period covers from August
2011 to June 2013; April 2012: April 20th, 2012 was the date on which the reform was announced; July 2012: July
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controlling by therapeutic group. Furthermore, our analysis overcomes the limitation of
previous studies considering simultaneously three key factors (stockpiling, exclusion of
426 drugs from public provision and date of monthly contribution ceilings implementa-
tion) that together with the co-payment increase impacted on consumption after the
reform.
A potential limitation of this study is that the specific disease of each individual in the sam-
ple was unknown. We only had information about dispensed drugs and, consequently, we
were not able to exactly detect comorbidities. However, we explained in the methodology sec-
tion that CNM and ATC codes allowed us to create the therapeutic groups. Each one of these
therapeutic groups has an associated price-elasticity value that served as an orientation guide
to the chronicity of the disease to be treated. This is because the price-elasticity for non-
chronic is greater (around -0.20) than the price-elasticity for chronic diseases (around -0.08)
among the elderly population [4].
1st, 2012 was the date on which the reform entered into force (date of cost-sharing change); September 2012:
September 1st, 2012 was the date on which 426 were excluded from public provision. Model 1 refers to the
regression model run with all the medicines of the database (including the drugs excluded from public provision).
Model 2 refers to the regression model run without the drugs excluded from public provision. NOTE: We were not
able to exactly know if the individuals of the sample had comorbidities because we did not have information about
the specific diseases of each individual. Therefore, we have approached the case of a patient having comorbidities as
one who has been dispensed medicines from two or more therapeutic groups. We compared these results with the
effect of a patient who was dispensed medicines from one therapeutic group.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0213403.g016
Table 6. Overall effect of the cost-sharing change on the pharmaceutical consumption by comorbidities NOTE.
Low-income pensioners and low-
income working population analysis
Middle-income working population and low-
income working population analysis
People who have been dispensed medicines of two or more therapeutic groups
During-before the
announcement
5.56���(1.12) 0.56 (1.44)
After-during the
announcement
-20.37���(0.98) -1.27 (1.16)
People who have been dispensed medicines of one therapeutic group
During-before the
announcement
1.15���(0.35) 0.01 (0.16)
After-during the
announcement
2.60��� (0.32) 0.43��� (0.14)
The table contains Difference-in-Difference estimates from linear regression models with robust standard errors.
Each cell contains results of the model from different therapeutic groups. All regressions include age and age2, and
time dummies. Within each cell, we first report the estimated coefficients; we then report in parentheses robust
standard errors. The therapeutic groups are sorted by price-elasticity (at the top the most inelastic, while at the
bottom the most elastic).
NOTE: We were not able to exactly know if the individuals of the sample had comorbidities because we did not have
information about the specific diseases of each individual. Therefore, we have approached the case of a patient having
comorbidities as one who has been dispensed medicines of two or more therapeutic groups. We compared these
results with the effect of a patient who has been dispensed medicines from one therapeutic group.
Significance levels
���p < 0.01
��p < 0.05.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0213403.t006
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5. Conclusions
Our first finding is that the negative impact of the cost-sharing change on consumption
among low-income pensioners is small. The results also appear to confirm that co-payments
do not affect the consumption of middle-income working population. Secondly, the analysis
reflects the existence of heterogeneity in the impact of the cost-sharing by therapeutic groups.
In this regard, the analysis of stockpiling, a key factor in fully understanding the impact of the
reform on drug consumption, revealed that the reduction in consumption was a consequence
of prior stockpiling, especially, among the most inelastic therapeutic groups (related to chronic
diseases). Nonetheless, the monthly follow-up analysis expanded on this information and
showed that the non-recovery observed in any of the therapeutic groups in the subsequent
months after the reform, might imply a risk of loss of medication adherence. We especially
detected a likely risk among those individuals who were dispensed medicines from two or
more therapeutic groups, which are associated with people with comorbidities. Thirdly, the
exclusion of 426 drugs from public provision impacted on consumption more than the cost-
sharing increase. In any case, as we did not detect a total recovery of consumption when we
ran the analysis without the excluded medicines, the risk of a loss of medication adherence was
present. This risk was especially marked among the most inelastic therapeutic groups (cardio-
vascular and anti-hypelipidemics), which are strongly associated with chronic diseases.
Finally, our analysis provides evidence of the existence of heterogeneity in the reform’s
impact by therapeutic groups with a higher sensitive to co-payments among chronic patients
and individuals with comorbidities than among non-chronic patients. Accordingly, the Span-
ish Government should consider setting up a co-payment scheme that controls both the nature
of the disease being treated (e.g., applying co-payments according to the therapeutic group
that each drug belongs to) and the existence of individuals with comorbidities.
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